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[So F. No. 17620. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1949.]

Estate of GUST BURNISON, Deceased. JOE BURNISON,
Appellant, V. PHIL C. KATZ, as Public Administrator,
etc., et aI., Respondents.
[1] Wills-Right of Testamental'7 Disposition.-The right to make

testamentary disposition of propery is not an inherent one, but
rests on the will of the Legislature, which may withhold the
right altogether or impose any conditions or limitations thereon
which it chooses.
[2] Id.-Who May Take Under Wm.-The Legislature has the
exclusive power to designate those whom the testator may make
the objects of his bounty.
[3] Conftict of Laws-Decedents' Estates.-The distribution of a
decedent's personal estate is governed by the law of his domicile.
[4] Wills-Who lIrtay Take Under Wm.-The words "the state,"
as used in Prob. Code, § 27, declaring that a testamentary disposition may be made to the state, do not include the United
States or any state other than California.
[1] See 26 CalJur. 628; 57 Am.Jur. 73.
[3] See 5 CaLJur. 473; 11 Am.Jur. 368.
[4J Sec 23 OaLJur. 730, 732; 26 CaLJur. 928; 57 Am.Jur. 74MeK. Dig. References: [1) Wills, 13; [2, 4-6) Wills, 16;
[3] Conflict of Laws, 119.
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disposition of property is not an. inherent right or a right
of cit.izcnship, nor is it. even a right granted by t.he constitution.
It rests wholly upon the legislative will, and is derived entirely from the statutes." (In re Walker, 110 Cal. 387, 390
[42 P. 815, 52 Am.St.Rep. 104, 30 L.R.A. 460]; see, also,
Estate of Carpenter, 172 Cal. 268, 269 [156 P. 464, L.R.A.
1916E 498]; Estate of Wilkinson, 113 Cal.App. 645, 646
[298 P. 1037].) The Legislature may withhold the right altogether, or impose any conditions or limitations upon it which
it chooses. (Estate of Durlewanger, 4'1 Cal.App,2d 750, 752
[107 P.2d 477]; Estate of Bauer, 51 Cal.App.2d 636, 637
[124 P.2d 630].) [2] As a necessary postulate of this
proposition, it follows that the Legislature has the exclusive
power to designate those whom the testator may make the
objects of his bounty. (In re Wilmerding, 117 Cal. 281, 284
[49 P. 181].)
[3] Equally well settled is the general rule that the distribution of a decedent's personal .estate is governed by the
law of his domicile. (Estate of Sloan, 7 Cal.App.2d319, 333334 [46 P.2d 1007].) It was early recogriized in decisions of
this state-as Estate of Apple, 66 Cal. 432, 436-437 [6 P. 7] ;
Whitney v.Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 197-198 [38 P. 636] ; Estate
of Lathrop, 165 Cal. 243, 247 [131 P. 752]-and it is likewise
declared by section 946 of the Civil Code.
In the light of these established principles, the language of
section 27 of the Probate Code, prescribing·" who may take
by will," must be construed as determinative of the validity
of the I>equest bere. inquestion... That section reads as follows:
"A testamentary I disposition may be made to the state, to
counties, to municipal corporations, to natural persons capable
by law of taking the property, to unincorporated religious,
benevolent or fraternal societies or associations or lodges or
branches thereof, and to corporations formed for religious,
scientific, literary, or solely educational or hospital or sanatorium purposes, or primarily for the public preservation of
fOl'ests and natural scenery, or to maintain public libraries,
museums or art galleries, or for similar public purposes. No
other corporation can take under a will, unless expressly authorized by statute."
[4] The government cites the opening language of the
statute, in its designation of "the state" as a proper recipient
of a "tpstamentary dispositiou," as embracing the United
Slates. Butin construing a statute, words are to be taken in
U.ldr ordinary sense and normal signification (23 Cal.J ur.
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§ 109, p. 730; Tayl(}rv. Vu.ndhlarir., 4~ Cal. App.2cl 63R, G41
[111 P.2d 344j; Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal.App.2d 255, 262
[138 P.2d 763]), and the government's suggu.<.;ted ext.ension of
the meaning of "the state" runs counter to this settled rule.
Althoullh it ruust be recognized that historians and other
writers frequently use the literary or rhetorical expression and
refer to the nation as "the state," the draftsmen of legislation as a rule employ language notable for its precise and
definiti\'e character rather than for its elegance. So it would
appear that if the Legislature had intended to include the
United States within the purvitlw of the statute, U 'the ordi.
nary dignities of speech would have led' to its mention by
name." (United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600,
606 [61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed.l071] ,citing Daw v. PringZe, 268
U.S. 315, 318 [45 S.Ct. 549, 69 L.Ed. 974].) Also the collocation of the successively authorized recipients of a "testamentary disposition" should be taken into consideration in eon·
struing the meaning of the terms of the statute. (23 Cal.Jur.
§ 110, p. 732; People v. One 1940 Chrysler Coupe, 48 Cal.App.
2d 546, 549 [120 P.2d 117].) Here the collection of "the
state" is with "counties" and U municipal corporations," an
obvious incongruity if the government's contention were accepted.
Moreover, the statute uses the definite article in its mention
of "the state," ostensibly to signify California and to distinguish its purport from the indefinite reference of "a state, "
.which latter term might reasonably. be construed to mean any
established government on earth. So pertinent is the legisla.
tive history of section 27 of the Probate Code. As first
enacted in 1872 as section 1275 of the Civil Code, it was provided that "no corporation" could take from a California
testator "unless expressly authorized by statute" so to do.
In 1873 the section was amended so that corporations" formed
for scientific, literary, or solely educational purposes" might
take under such a will. (Amendments to the codes, 1873-74,.
p.275.) In 1881 a separate statute was enacted authorizing
the "several counties, cities and counties, cities and towns
of this state to accept . • . any gift, bequest and devise. . ."
(Stats. 1881, p. 2.) In 1903~ section 1275 was amended to permit corporations formed for "hospital purposes" also to take
under a will. (Stats. 1903, p. 258.) In 1905, the section was
further amended to permit "counties" and "municipal eor·
poration.," to take under a Calliurnia will. aubjeet to the
.c~
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provisi(l'1li of 1""-' j'm 1:U:l. t l.t(>aJlh~t:I'tl"J!t ." .. "··~io!l 11 <.,f th~
Probate Code eoncPl"uillg . rest.rict.iom;·· "P"" dlaritable bequests and devises (Stats. 1905, p. 605), aud the code commissioner's note ;,;hows that "The amendment in substance incorporates into the section the provisions of the act of 1881,
page 2, authorizing the several counties, cities and counties,
cities and towns of the state, to recover property by gift,
bequest and devise." (See legislative history !'Iubjoined to
section 1275.) Manifestly, therefore, when "counties" and
"municipal corporations" were so engrafted into section 1275,
they carried the same geographical meaning of territorial
components of this state as the "act of 1881" had expressly
given them, and which they had signified for 24 years. Then
in 1931, when, upon adoption of the Probate Code, the Legislature added to the list of entities privileged to take under
a California will "the state" in connection with "counties"
and "municipal corporations," it could not have meant any
state other than California.
The case of United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 [24 L.Ed. 192],
is closely in point. There the testator, a resident of the
state of New York, "devised and bequeathed" all his property
"to the government of the United States." The statute of
New York provided that a devise of lands might be made "to
any person capable by law of holding real estate; but no
devise to a corporation shall be valid unless such corporation
be expressly authorized by its charter or by statute to take
by devise." The sole question presented for consideration
was "th:e validitYJ)f_tLdevise tothe.United.States of real
estate situated in the State of New York." The Supreme
Court of the United States declared (as the state court had,
52 N.Y. 530, 534 [11 Am.Rep. 751J) that "this question"
was "to be determined by the laws of [New York]." (94 U.S.
320.) Then the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field,
stated at page 321 as follows: "The term 'person' as here
used applies to natural persons, and also to artificial persons,bodies politic, deriving their existence and powers from legislation,-but cannot be so extended as to include within its
meaning the Federal government. It would require an express
(Iefinition to that effect to give it a sense thus extended....
A devise to the United States of real property situated in that
State [New York], is, thtlrefore, void."
I t is true that the NeW' York law imposed limitations afi'ectin;,r only devises of "rt',,1 t'foItate" while the present C8SP ('on('f'rIlN the validity of 11 bt'41wst of perRonalty unuer :1 SI:lIIlH'
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regulating alike t.he power of testamentary dispo::;ition as hi
real and personal property. But such difference ill statutory
scope does not militate agail1st the applicable force herp of
the reasoning in the Fox case, based as it is on the right of a
state to prescribe who can, and who cannot, take by the will
of one of its residents. So significant is the case of Unitl:d
States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625 [16 S.Ct. 1073, 41 L.l!ld 2871,
wherein the "single question" presented was "whether per.
sonal property bequeathed by will to the United States [was]
subject to an inheritance tax under the laws of New York."
(Emphasis added.) Recognizing the right to make a testamentary disposition as "purely a creature of statute and
within legislative control" (p. 627), and that when a state
"grants" such right, it may annex" any conditions which it
supposes to be required by its interests or policy" (pp. 629630), the court, following citation of the Fox case, supra,
sustained the propriety of the tax-in "diminution" of the
amount the United States would receive under the will-as
it was "only upon [such] condition that the legislatl1l"e
asseut[ed] to [the] bequest" (p. 630). And as recelJdy
as 1942 the Supreme Court of the United States in Irving
Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 [62 8.Ct. 398, 86 L.Ed. 452,
137 A.L.R. 1093], wherein was sustained the validity of a
section of the "New York Decedent Estate Law" concerning
the right of a surviving spouse to elect to take against the provisions of a will, cited both the Fox and Perkins cases, supra,
among others, in support of its broad statement at page 562,
as follows: "Rights of succession to the property of a deceased,
whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and
the dead hand rules succession only by suffrance. Nothing in
the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to
limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary
disposition over property within its jurisdiction." (Emphasis
added.) (See, also, Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, 659;
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 [67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1633,
170 A.L.R. 953].)
The government's contention that if section 27 of the Probate Code should· be construed as invalidating the bequest
in question, "serious constitutional questions would arise"
involving an "unlawful discrimination against the United
States" is effectively answered by the h'villg '1'rust Co. caloW
as above quoted. Likewise the attack upon the pertiuf'Jley
of the basic rrasolling in the Fox case, supra, and the claim
that aSsuming" the Fox case cannot be distinguished, it Willit
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;.be regarded &Ii overruled" are without force in view of its
.eihtion as recently QS 1942 by the Supreme Court as noted.
Nor do~ the reference in the latlt sentence of section 27
of the Probate Code to tIte tI~t:Cllt:ntary capacity of a "corporatio~ ... expr~ly nuthorizcd by !Otatute" aid the government in its att0I1I.pt to uphold the validity of the bequest
in question. Whether ur 1&ot the word "corporation" in such
"l~gislativu unvirowuc1&t" wuuld include the United States
as Ii "govemJucntal budy" (see State of Ohio v. Helvrring,
292 U.S. 360, 370 [G4 :i.Ct. 725, 7b L.Nd. 1307]; State of
GeorgiG v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 [62 S.Ct. 972, 86 L.Ed.
1346]), the furtht!l' r"oquirement of the section is concededly
un.·:ati<died in the ~vcrnment'8 admission that though "varion." FederqJ statutus enacted from time to time have authorized partic11lar agencies of the Government to acquire property
by will :wd to apply it to stated U8C8 ••• no Federal statute of
general application has purported to authorize the United
States to so acquire property." [6] It is true that the
capacity of the United States to "receive a voluntary den';e
or b~quest" has been regarded as an "inhercnt attribute of
8Overuignty" and 80 sustained as an ilnplied power of the
feder:&! governlUent, but !Ouch principle hns no force where
there is an "express statute" of the state wherein "the testator had his domicil" effecting "a restriction as to who may
be devisceIO or legatees." (Dickson. v. United States, 125 Mass.
311,315 [28 Am.Rep. 230].) In short, the entire matter of the
right of teb1amentary disposition appears to be one within the
eoatzol of the state having jurisdiction of the property in questIoa, and there is no constitution'll requirement t.hllt the state
aUow the UnitedlStates to take "under a will." (United States
v. Ji'o~, ",pra, 94 U.S. 315; United States v. Perkif&s, supra, 163
U.S. 625; If"t1ing Tf"1I.St (Jo. v. Day, supra, 314 U.S. 556.)
[8] Nor does it strtlngthen the governJl&ent's pOlolition to
reft!r to IIt:CtiOll 13841 of the Revenue and TaXo'\tion Code,
which e."((;1Upts "property transferred to ••• the United
SVitra" from th~ Cnliforl1ia inheritance t.u. 'l'here is no
llCCeISR'U7 (.."OllDtlction Lctwecn a statute regulating succcmlion
to vrvvcrtj' and one setting forth t:a exctnptions, altd in
m:lkillJ: lawa relating to thcaoe two subjects, over which it bad
plenary a.uthority, the Legislature was-not honnd to a;h."pe its
respective enactments to nt any particular pntt.:.rn or limit its
right to ituposc such conditions as it dt.'emcd appropriate in
the distinct nelds. (11& reWilmtlf"ding, npra, 117 Cal. 281,
2bG-287.) 'l'herc may be, for examplc, a trUll:lfcr of prol'~rty-
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th•. re2lj.lue of a v~tur"n '. pCD.'1ion fUJw-1.otliu lJnitctl St:,tCll
unu~r the ft-tlcrltl {,gChellt 13\\"8 (Estat"u! Li'ilJquut, 25 C:ll.:!d
697,705 [liB P.2d 879], ccrt. d,.l1. 325 U.S. 8611 L65 S.Ct. 1,Wb,
BIU. Q.9 fJ.Ea. l~b8] ; Estate of Walktr, 25 O~l.~d 719. 7~~
.(1~14 l'.2d t:S91], ccrt. d"n. 325 U.S. 869 [65 S.Ot. 1408. 1410,
89 L.E.t l:Jbb, 190:1]) or in pursuancc of a contract where},y
a vutt.l'.n, pr.·l't ,!ui:;itc to entry into a national soldiers' hom.~,
agreed that all his persunw property should P&SI:I to the bOlU'd
of In.''lnagcl'N of such home under certain circUJlU!tunce; ( United
Statu v. Stevens, 302 U.S. 623 [58 S.Ct. a~b, 82 L.Ed. 484] ;
Mauck v. United Statu, 94 F.2d 745). But such liituations do
not furnish any parallel considerations negativing the force
of ~ection 27 of the Probate Oode as determinative of righbl of
tc,c;tamenmry disposition of property' 'within [the1dominion"
of this state. (United Btates v. Perkins, supra, 163 U.S. 625,
629.)
The government finally relies on the Estate of H endria:, 77
Oal.A..pp.2d 647 [176 P.2d 3981, to sustain the bequest in question, but an analysis of that case shows it to involve quite
di-;!Umilar considerations. There tht! bequest was made to the
"United States Veterans Adtuinistration ... for the purpose
of rendering to disabled veterans of the world war •• . such
aid, comfort, [and] assit;tance ... as may to them be most
hclpfuland profitable, determinable by said ... [organization]." (P.649.) As the successor of "a corporation, 'The
National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers' " (p. 652),
the "Vctl!rans' Administration" is authorized, through its
"Bo"rd of Managers," to "receive donations of money "Or -property ••• [which would] embrace gifts by means of wills,
Loa well sa by transfurs during the lifetime of the donors."
(P. 653.) Upon classifying the Veterans Adlninistration as
a "governmcntal agency," though unincorporated, and in
diseussing its testamentary capacity to accept the beqU&;t in
qnestion under the laws of Oalifornia (Prob. Oode, § 27),
the court declared that "the bequest to the agency was, in
effect. a bequest to the parent, United States of America"
(p. 651), that "the United States Government is a corporation" (p. 652), that "the [agency] is authorized by statute
to take property by will" (p. 652), and that therefore the
United SbltUi Government, functioning through one of its
compollent p'lrts in a designated field of operation, is a "corporation ... expressly authorized by statute" to "take [property] under a will" within the purport of section 27 of
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But chI' \.,Ji"il~ "r lhe·I:'~qut:;.'
fhat gl'IIllllol, 1111', at; the court
iiu]ieated in its reference to the analogous (:ollsiderations pre\'IIi1in~ in the E.~tate ot Yule, 57 Cal.App.2d 652 [135 P.2d
mw J, the terms of the will, as rtlasonably construed, provided
for "n gift for chllritable purposes to a legally constituted
iw;titution" (p. 654), and whether or not such recipient
WIIS ., incorporated" or "unincorporated" wa.'i not a material
bctor affecting its capacity to take the "donation" ar. 80
restricted. Accordingly. the bequest to the United States
.V,'tcral1S Administration was properly deemed valid in the
li!!ht of the liberal provisions of the statute evidencing the
h·gislative purpose to favor H gifts for charitable purposes"
in pursuance of "the intent of the donor" (Estate of Yule,
,yupra, p. 654), and the further discussion in the Hendrix case
relative to the propriety of holding the "United States of
America" t.o be a "corporation authorized to take by will
pursuant to Section 27 of the Probate Code" (p. 650) was
unnecessary to the decision, and certainly will not be regarded
as furnishing ground for sustaining a bequest to the "United
States GovernDlcnt," without qualification as to administration or purpose. l<'row these underlying considerations-both
factual and legal-distinguishing the essential focal point of
decision, it is JJlauifc:;t that the government's reliance upon
the .Hendrix case in nowise b-trengthens its position here. In
view of the nature of the power of testamentary disposition,
the right of the state to dctcrmine the limits under which this
... --.... .power ..shallbe exercised, and the express terms of section 27
of the Prob~te Code prescribing "who may take by will,"
tile,bequest here challenged cannot be sustained as meeting
the test of the cited statute, and hence is void.
The order subject of this appeal is reversed.
'. . : l'r'JIJatlt Cnrk

,I'. Gfi:U

111Crt; lUvolvl!ll ,wed lIot rest
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Gibson, C~ J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Edmonds. J., concurred in the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent for the reasons set forth in Estat.
of Hendrix, 77 Cal.App.2d 647, 651-653 [176 P.2d 398].
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